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Abstract  
This research addresses three questions with respect to environmental, social, and corporate 
governance (ESG) investing. (1) Do ESG rating agencies weigh disclosure scores more heavily 
than performance scores when calculating total ESG scores? (2) If changing disclosure scores is 
easier for companies, have companies been able to improve them over time? (3) How can 
publicly-traded companies improve their scores given common rating agency practices? Using 
ESG<GO> Bloomberg terminal function, I compiled panel data on companies’ total ESG scores 
over time. I found that generally, rating agencies weigh ESG disclosure scores more heavily than 
performance scores. Specifically, Bloomberg ESG Disclosure scores improved over an eight-
year time period. Publically-traded companies can improve their overall scores by restructuring 
their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
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In the past two decades, the world witnessed an exponential growth in the number of 
companies measuring and reporting environmental, social, and governance data together called 
ESG data. The market for ESG related investments grew $8.7 US trillion in assets under 
management in 2017, up more than 33% since 2014 (Skroupa, 2018). Socially Responsible 
Investing (SRI) is the financial investment process which takes into account social, 
environmental, and corporate governance impacts and investment in the community (Olmedo et 
al., 2010). It relies on an exacting fiduciary process and detailed analyses of corporate practices 
that companies, agencies, or NGOs carry out (Hawken, 2004). Demand from institutional 
investors, changes in regulations, and external pressures from NGOs are all explanations for the 
growth in demand for SRI.  
 [2] Motivation 
Given the rise in popularity of responsible investment, a number of ESG rating agencies 
and institutions have emerged that link stakeholders to companies. These rating agencies, 
indices, or rankings assess corporations based on their ESG performance. Besides many ESG 
ratings, there are about 500 rankings, 170 different ESG related indices, 100+ awards, and at 
least 120 voluntary standards (Mooij, 2017). According to the Global Initiative for Sustainable 
Ratings, well over 100 rating agencies provide ESG scores on publicly traded companies, and 
more than 1,400 specialized socially responsible firms use ESG data when analyzing stocks and 
bonds (Amel-Zadeh et al., 2017). These agencies are growing due to two main factors: the 
expansion of the securities markets and the growth of regulation regarding the disclosure of ESG 
related information (Olmedo, 2010). Due to the fast-evolving and extremely competitive market 
in question, providers are racing to grow their businesses and increase their influence.  
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In the past decade, companies increased disclosure of their ESG practices. While fewer 
than 20 companies disclosed ESG data in the early 1990s, the number of companies issuing 
sustainability or integrated reports has increased to nearly 9,000 by 2016 (Amel-Zadeh et al., 
2017). But there still remains a lack of standard and a lack of consensus on national and 
international benchmarks. The information is either incomparable or investors do not know how 
to interpret it (Mooij, 2017). ESG initiatives vary widely, conditional on the audience that they 
are looking to serve and the criteria/indicators that they take into account. Given that the rating 
agencies are a critical intermediary between companies and investors, it is imperative to 
investigate possible impediments.  
Rating agencies typically base their assessment on public information and oftentimes 
send questionnaires, asking to hold interviews or even sight visits. According to the Rate the 
Raters initiative by SustainAbility, “while ratings using solely public information have increased 
in number, more than 60% of the ratings in our inventory depend wholly or-in part on 
information submitted by companies or ratings organizations” (Rate the Raters, 2010, p.5). In the 
majority of cases, companies who do not respond to surveys typically fare a lot worse than 
responders. If a company does not disclose, a ratings firm has no foundation for its rating and 
often assigns a lower score based on the absence of data (Rate the Raters, 2010). For example, 
only companies that have produced a publicly-available sustainability report that covers at least 
20% of the core environmental and social Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 indicators are 
eligible for certain indexes like: NASDAQ and CRD (Rate the Raters, 2010). Since compiling all 
of the necessary information to complete the surveys requires ample time and resources, this 
criterion gives an unfair advantage to larger companies who have the means to check off all of 
the boxes in the questionnaires. 
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Recent academic evidence has even found that there is a low correlation between ESG 
ratings (Chatterji et al., 2014). Though most rating agencies have sophisticated methodologies, 
the authors found that different agencies often diverge in their ratings of the same firm, creating 
uncertainty for managers and stakeholders, and posing challenges for researchers. Such 
convergence seems to originate from two sources: (1) the lack of a common theorization of CSR 
and (2) difference in how raters measure the same construct (Bouten, 2016). The lack of 
convergence across raters pose significant challenges for practice. Companies should be able to 
understand whether poor ratings are due to “poor results, a different conceptualization of 
corporate social responsibility than the raters, or poor measurement methods” (Chatterji et al., 
2014, p. 3). If ratings cannot consistently identify socially responsible firms, then one cannot 
value the hypothesized benefits of SRI investing on a corporate level. Since practitioners rely on 
ESG scores as a proxy for ESG performance, and it is a costly endeavor for companies to invest 
in ESG initiatives, it is crucial for both academics and practitioners to understand the validity of 
this new industry of rating agencies (Mooij, 2017). 
If consumers and investors are willing to make their purchase and investment decision 
based on CSR but only have access to incomplete information or information they do not trust, 
information asymmetries can crowd sustainability-oriented companies out of the market 
(Windolph, 2011). This creates a phenomenon known as “a market for lemons” – where 
responsible companies are unidentifiable; therefore, consumers and investors are not willing to 
pay for their products or invest in those companies. Consumers and stakeholders are unable to 
verify the sustainability claims made by companies because they do have the relevant 
information, an example of information asymmetry. In order to prevent such a market for lemons 
and combat information asymmetries, economists consider two basic approaches: signaling and 
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screening. Signaling, in this context, “means that companies emit credible signals indicating their 
sustainability orientation” (Windolph, 2011, p.40). An example of this would be the publication 
of annual sustainability reports. However, signals only adequately fulfill their function if 
consumers perceive them as being reliable. Greenwashing would still be a concern. Investopedia 
defines greenwashing as, “the disinformation disseminated by an organization so as to present an 
environmentally responsible public image” (Investopedia, 2018). Annual CSR reports serve as a 
tool in presenting this environmentally responsible public image.  
 An alternative approach to overcoming the information asymmetry is screening, 
“consumers, investors, or stakeholders actively search for and evaluate information on the 
sustainability performance of companies” (Windolph, 2011, p.40). Given that consumers and 
investors cannot access all of the relevant data themselves, rating agencies must screen 
companies effectively and emit positive or negative signals to investors.  
 [3] Literature Review  
Given growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR), current research is 
beginning to question the construct validity of these ratings (Chatterji et al., 2009). In Chatterji et 
al.’s 2009 paper, “How well do social ratings actually measure corporate social responsibility?” 
they examine how widely-used ratings – those of Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini Research and 
Analytics (KLD) – provide transparency about past and future environmental performance. They 
obtained data on each of KLD’s 14 environmental “strength” and “concern” variables. Strength 
variables include: beneficial product and services; pollution prevention; recycling clean energy, 
etc. “Concern” variables include: hazardous waste; regulatory problems; ozone depleting 
chemicals; etc. They consider a firm’s future outlook by analyzing their environmental 
management plans “and investments that purport to enhance future environmental performance” 
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(Chatterji et al., 2009, p.126) They found that KLD’s “strength” ratings do not accurately predict 
future environmental performance while their “concern” ratings to be fairly good summaries of 
prior environmental performance (Chatterji et al., 2009). Although the study found that KLD in 
particular is a reasonable proxy for CSR performance, researches are only now beginning to 
question the consistency of these CSR ratings across different agencies.   
Surprisingly little research has focused on how rated organizations respond to these 
independent ratings. Aaron K. Chatterji and Michael W. Toffel in their academic paper, “How 
Firms Respond to Being Rated” address this gap by examining how firms respond to corporate 
environmental ratings.  They propose that these ratings, beyond their stated objective of 
influencing investors, also influence the rated firms. They test their hypothesis “firms that 
receive a poor environmental rating will subsequently improve their environmental performance 
more than with other firms” (Chatterji and Toffel, 2008, p.9). They obtained environmental 
ratings from KLD Research & Analytics but obtained environmental performance from the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). They found that firms 
initially rated poorly subsequently improved their performance by more than two groups of 
comparison firms: those never rated and those initially rated more positively. Although they shed 
light on how companies respond to KLD’s rating, it is unclear if KLD bases its scores solely on 
firm disclosure. They also cannot tell whether firms are responding directly to those ratings or 
other forces in the political, economic, or social environment. Understanding how and why firms 
respond differently to negative ratings, represents an important avenue for research.  
A number of scholars have also approached the issue of corporate responsibility through 
the lens of corporate financial performance (CFP). They predominantly investigate whether CSR 
affects CFP by showcasing a variety of results (Nollet 2016; Wang & Sarkis 2017). The body of 
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evidence accumulated about the nature of the relationship is equivocal. In the article, “Corporate 
social responsibility and financial performance relationship: a review of measurement 
approaches,” Galant and Cadez explain that the main reason for the equivocal empirical results is 
both “operationalized and measured.” The measurement of CFP includes profitability ratios 
extracted from financial statements that are relatively standardized while the measurement for 
CSR is far more problematic. Challenges include measurement issues, disclosure, and the 
operationalization of the CSR concept (Galant and Cadez, 2017). Thus, the studies finding a 
negative or small correlation between CSR metrics and financial performance may devalue the 
relationship by not taking into account noisy indicators of true CSR activities. Similarly, 
erroneous CSR matrices can also be the reason that studies find a positive relationship between 
CSR and financial performance (Chatteriji et al., 2007).  
Despite an enormous amount of literature on CSR affecting CFP, the effect of CSR 
disclosure and the directional effect of ESG scores on environmental performance remains an 
open empirical question. Gutsche, Schulz, and Gratwohl research the directional effect in their 
article, “Firm-value effects of CSR disclosure and CSR performance.” The economists examine 
the effect of CSR disclosure and CSR performance on firm value for S&P 500 firms from 2011 
to 2014. They find that “CSR disclosure is positively associated with firm value and that the 
effect of CSR disclosure on firm value is larger than the effect of CSR performance” (Gutsche et 
al., 2017, p.1). Gutsche, Schulz, and Gratwhol measured the CSR disclosure level using 
Bloomberg’s ESG Disclosure Score and used the Thomson Reuters’s ESG ASSET 4 score to 
measure CSR performance. They used a modified version of the Ohlson (1995) model1 for their 
                                                
1 “Firm value is proxied by market capitalization explained by net assets, operating income, size, 
and industry and firm fixed effects” (Gutsche et al. 2017)  
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analysis. They ran two regressions to the test the model. Model 1 uses CSR disclosure as the 
independent variable and includes CSR performance measured separately for all three ESG 
dimensions. Model 2 separates the effect of CSR disclosure based on firms’ being high or low 
CSR performers. They controlled for time and firm fixed effects (Gutsche et al., 2017).  
The results indicated that “for each index point improvement on the disclosure index, the 
firm value increased by US $260 million” while “firm value for each index point improvement in 
the performance score increased by only $109 million” (Gutsche et al., 2017, p.20). They argue 
that CSR disclosure mediates CSR performance through to a positivity bias – a relatively high 
amount of CSR disclosure misinterpreted as good CSR performance. It remains unclear from 
their research if companies use CSR disclosure as a marketing instrument to hide poor CSR 
performance. Given this information, I theorize that companies utilize the improved disclosure 
score as a “greenwashing” mechanism to signal good CSR performance.  The authors of the 
paper conclude that “words currently speak louder than actions” with regard to the firm value 
effect of CSR disclosure and CSR performance (Gutsche et al.,2017 p. 21).  
[4] Data and Methods 
This section outlines the description of the data and methodological approach used to 
answer the aforementioned research questions.  
Part 1: Selection of ESG rating agencies.  
I selected four rating agencies from the accessibility of the following information: (1) 
publicly available data on the Bloomberg terminal over time; (2) frequency of use as reported by 




[1.1] Publicly available data on the Bloomberg terminal.  
Bloomberg launched a ESG company analysis page called “ESG <GO>” to increase 
transparency and provide context around company ESG data (Bloomberg Impact Book, 2017). 
Bloomberg terminal service includes access to the ESG <GO> page. It has data on more than 
11,000 companies with over 700 environmental, social, and governance indicators from 
company-sourced filings and third-party information, covering virtually the entire publicly 
investable universe. Since its inception in 2012, the number of customers using the page 
increased from 5,172 to 12,242 (Bloomberg Impact Book, p.19). Bloomberg specifically 
collaborates with Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
Sustainalytics, and RobecoSAM to offer third-party ESG data and scores on the terminal.  
[1.2] Frequency of use as reported by Rate the Raters.  
The Rate the Raters project launched by SustainAbility attempts to better understand the 
universe of external sustainability ratings (Rate the Raters, 2012). The project offers a “unique, 
collaborative platform that uses research-driven insights, including targeted surveys of the most 
influential thought leaders in the sustainability arena, to explore the biggest sustainability 
challenges” (Rate the Raters, 2012, p.2). The stakeholders surveyed include leading sustainable 
development experts from five sectors: corporate, government, NGOS, institutional, and service. 
They polled 850 sustainability experts from over 70 countries, across multiple sectors. They 
asked them: Which ratings, rankings and indices do you prioritize? How do you use ratings in 
your work? How do you get value from ratings? The key findings of the survey found that NGOs 
are the most trusted by experts to judge corporate sustainability. The top 5 most credible indices 
are: CDP, Dow Jones Sustainability Index, Access to Medicines Index, the FTSE4Good Index. 
Furthermore, the following ratings experiences notable increases in credibility from 2012 to 
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2013: Bloomberg, Climate Counts and MSCI ESG Research. See Appendix Figure A.1 for a list 
of the most credible rating agencies.  
[1.3] Publicly available information about the rating agency’s assessment approach.  
Using the Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings (GISR) hub, I determined whether 
or not information about the rating agency’s assessment approach was readily available. GISR is 
a public benefit organization that works with investors, companies, ESG research and rating 
organization to improve worldwide access to high-quality sustainability ratings (About GISR, 
2017).  
 
From the aforementioned step-by-step process, I selected four rating agencies: 
Bloomberg, ISS, CDP, and Sustainalytics as shown in Table A, shaded in grey. RobecoSAM’s 
data on the Bloomberg terminal was not user friendly or easily accessible. MSCI and the Access 
to Medicines Index both did not have data available on the Bloomberg Terminal. Of the four 
rating agencies chosen, the following scores were most accessible: (1) Bloomberg ESG 
Disclosure Score; (2) Sustainalytics Total Score; (3) CDP Climate Change Performance Score; 
and (4) ISS Quality Score.  
Table A: Selection of ESG Rating Agencies 
Score Rating Agency Is the data available on 
the Bloomberg terminal? 
Is the agency listed in 
the top ten Rate the 
Raters project? 
Is the information 
about the rating 
agency on GISR? 
Bloomberg ESG Disclosure 
Score 
Bloomberg Yes Yes Yes 
Sustainalytics Total Score Sustainalytics Yes Yes Yes 
CDP Climate Change 
Performance Score 
Carbon Disclosure Project Yes Yes Yes 
Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) Quality 
Score 
ISS Yes No Yes 
Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index 
RobecoSAM No Yes Yes 
Access to Medicines Index Access to Medicine 
Foundation 
No Yes Yes 
MSCI MSCI No Yes Yes 
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Part 2: Qualitative Study of the Scoring Methodology.  
Next, I conducted a qualitative study on the different scoring methodologies inherent in 
the selected rating agencies’ assessment approach. I used the following three main sources when 
conducting the study: (1) GISR; (2) company reports; and (3) phone interviews. 
[2.1] Global Initiative for Sustainable Ratings  
GISR is, “a public benefit organization aimed at making financial markets agents of, 
rather than impediments to, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and broader global 
sustainability agenda” (About GISR, 2017). GISR does not rate agencies, instead it accredits 
sustainability ratings, ranking or indices based on their alignment with GISR’s principles. GISR 
has an online database, called the Hub, that consists of: profiles of ESG research and rating 
organizations, registry comprising principles-based information, list of ESG ratings accredited to 
GISR’s principles, searchable database of ESG research and ratings industry, and reports and 
publication. Their database consists of 156 organizations and 652 products. Figure A.2 in the 
appendix is a screenshot of the return to search of Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Scores.  
[2.2] Company Reports  
Each rating agency posts a framework or methodology report on their website discussing 
the indicators that they took into account and their respective weights. I searched their 
homepages and conducted google searches to find the information.  
[2.3] Interviews with Representatives  





Part 3: Quantitative analysis of data using case studies.  
Lastly, I conducted a two-part quantitative analysis of the data compiled using 
Bloomberg ESG <GO> terminal. This analysis included: (1) an exploration of general 
observational trends by both rating agency and sector; and (2) a case study of two publicly traded 
companies within the same sector.  
[3.1] Exploration of descriptive statistics and observational trends 
This research uses panel data from 2008 to 2016 to test if overall ESG scores and 
disclosure scores increased over time. This thesis hypothesizes that companies take advantage of 
the system by easily increasing their disclosure scores. The dataset compiled has observations 
from 9,282 publicly traded companies and four rating agencies. The data includes: ISS QS from 
2014 to 2017, Sustainalytics total scores from 2015 to 2017, CDP integrated scores in 2016, and 
Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Scores from 2008 to 2016.  
Table 1.1 and 1.2 report descriptive statistics on the average scores for each rating agency 
over time. In addition to providing a statistical portrait of the data, I also conduct an initial 
analysis of the average score from 2008 to 2016. As shown in Table 1.1, there is a trend: as the 
years progressed, the number of observations increased. It is interesting to note that although 
Bloomberg’s overall ESG scores range from 0 to 100, no publicly traded company has gotten a 
score higher than 86.36. Table 1.2 specifically represents mean scores over time. An important 
limitation to note is that I only have observations from all four rating agencies for one year, 






[3.2] Case Study 
 In order to answer how companies can improve their ESG scores over time, I chose two 
publicly traded companies from the same sector for a case study. The case study compares and 




Table 1. 1 Descriptive Statistics: Summary Table of Variables 
Variable 
Observations 
Year # of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
ISS Quality 
Score 
2014 3185 5.42 2.87 1 10 
2015 3863 5.44 2.88 1 10 
2016 4591 5.43 2.88 1 10 
2017 4955 5.38 2.88 1 10 
Sustainalytics 2015 1492 53.46 29.04 0 100 
2016 1593 52.71 29.12 0 100 
2017 1697 53.07 28.85 0 100 
CDP Integrated 2016 1567 5.47 1.81 1 8 
Bloomberg 2008 3963 21.91 12.64 0.83 69.83 
2009 4589 21.73 13.70 1.24 82.64 
2010 6030 21.04 13.61 0.83 86.36 
2011 6632 21.36 13.98 0.83 86.36 
2012 7210 21.85 13.95 1.32 86.36 
2013 7628 22.81 14.09 2.07 84.30 
2014 8082 23.55 14.27 2.07 85.54 
2015 8581 23.5 14.16 2.07 83.06 
2016 9035 22.93 14.00 0.83 73.14 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics: Mean Scores Over time 







Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score 
(bloomberg) 
2008 . . . 21.91 
2009 . . . 21.73 
2010 . . . 21.04 
2011 . . . 21.36 
2012 . . . 21.85 
2013 . . . 22.81 
2014 5.42 . . 23.55 
2015 5.44 53.46 . 23.50 
2016 5.43 52.71 5.47 22.93 
2017 5.38 53.07 . . 
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[5] Results and Analysis 
 
Part 1 & 2: Results 
As discussed in the data & methods section, the purpose of the qualitative phase of the 
research is to evaluate whether the quality of ESG assessment is sufficient enough to support 
mission-aligned investing. Initial research shows that there are three key processes inherent in all 
ESG data collection methodologies: 1) data collection; 2) data analysis; and 3) data updating. 
According to the Capstone Project Team’s report on Navigating ESG Data for Foundations:  
1. Data collection is each agency’s approach to gathering information.  
2. Data analysis is the methodology used to score a company’s ESG overall score. 
3. Data updating refers to how often a company updates scores or evaluates the 
company (Chan et al., 2017).  
I assessed and analyzed each rating agency using the three key processes above. Table 2.1 below 
summarizes my findings.  
[2.1] Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score 
 Bloomberg collects ESG data for over 9,000 publicly-listed companies globally (Davis 
Polk, 2017). The ESG disclosure score rates companies based on their disclosure of policy-rated 
ESG data. Data collection: Bloomberg assesses raw data from company-produced materials 
including: website information, sustainability and corporate social responsibility reports, 
regulatory filings, company brochures, and corporate presentations. Bloomberg does not contact 
firms requesting the information, it is entirely the responsibility of the firm to provide that 
information. Rating agencies penalize companies for missing data by way of point reduction in 
disclosure scoring. Data analysis: Bloomberg evaluates companies on the robustness of their 
disclosure on ESG criteria. They do not evaluate performance. Scores range from 0.1 for 
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companies that disclose a minimum amount of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data 
point collected by Bloomberg. Rating agencies tailor scores to different industry sectors and only 
evaluate companies on criteria that is relevant to the industry sector. The criteria are not available 
to the public. Data updating: Rating agencies update scores annually. In order to improve 
scores, Bloomberg professionals recommend that companies become more acquainted with 
disclosure expectations for their relative industry. They also suggest that companies adapt the 
framework recommended by GRI, format their annual report to allow for searching, and disclose 
their CSR initiatives annually in a medium that is easily accessible to Bloomberg analysts 
(Bloomberg Framework, 2017).  
[2.2] Sustainalytics Total Score  
Sustainalytics assesses a company’s performance on ESG issues relative to other firms in 
the same industry peer group. Sustainalytics is the 2008 consolidation of DSR, Scoris and AIS 
(Davis Polk, 2017, p.7). Sustainalytics now covers over 6,500 companies across 42 sectors and 
has an international presence. Scores range from 0 to 100. Data collection: The process starts 
with the collection of company data via its own disclosure, media, and NGO reporting. Data 
analysis: Sustainalytics covers about 70 indicators in each industry. They split indicators into 
three main dimensions: preparedness, disclosure, and qualitative and quantitative performance. 
Preparedness includes “the assessment of management systems and politics in place to help 
manage ESG risks.” Disclosure indicates whether “company reporting meets international best 
practice standards and is transparent in relation to ESG issues.” Quantitative performance is 
“based on quantitative metrics such as carbon intensity.” Qualitative performance is “based on 
analysis of controversial incidents that the company may be involved in” (Sustainalytics 
Research Methodology, 2017, p.2). Data updating: Each company’s report updates once a year 
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based on an internal planning schedule. After Sustainalytics creates a draft report, they send the 
report to each company. Companies get the opportunity to give feedback and provide additional 
and updated information before Sustainalytics makes the final report accessible publicly to all of 
their clients.  
[2.3] CDP Integrated Performance Score  
The CDP Integrated Performance score reflects the level of company commitment to 
climate change mitigation, adaption, and transparency. CDP requires each company to have a 
baseline score for disclosure. CDP scores range from 0 to 8. A score of 0 equals a failure to 
provide sufficient information. Data collection: When companies ask to participate in the 
process and have the baseline disclosure score, CDP sends them a questionnaire to fill out. CDP 
only assesses the information disclosed in the questionnaire. Keep in mind that “neither CDP nor 
the scorers or report-writers verify the information in any individual company response. 
Information outside of the CDP response is not considered in question-level scoring.” There is 
also an evaluation/administration fee of US $975 for companies (CDP Scoring, 2017, p. 3).  
Data analysis: CDP assesses companies across four sections: disclosure, awareness, 
management, and leadership. The awareness level score measurers the “comprehensiveness of a 
company’s evaluation of how environmental issues intersect with its business.” CDP awards 
management level points for answers that provide evidence of actions associated with good 
environmental managed determined arbitrarily by CDP. They award leadership level points to 
companies that score highly in all other levels. “At the end of the scoring, the number of points a 
company is awarded per level is divided by the maximum number that could have been awarded. 
The fraction is then converted to a percentage by multiplying by 100 and rounding to the nearest 
whole number” (CDP Scoring, 2017, p. 4). They award the final letter grade based on the highest 
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achieved level not the average. “For example, if company XYZ achieved 88% in Disclosure 
level, 76% in Awareness and 65% in Management, their overall score is a B (88%).”  CDP bases 
its score solely on activities and positions disclosed in the CDP response, which is limiting in 
nature. Data updating: Companies respond to the questionnaire annually. After submitting the 
questionnaire, CDP charges an amendment fee to companies who wish to amend questionnaire 
post submission.   
 [2.4] Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Quality Score 
 ISS Quality Scores provide in-depth research on corporate governance on over 5,600 
publicly traded companies globally. The scores range from 1 to 10.  A score of 1 indicates 
relatively higher quality governance practices and relatively lower governance risk. A score of 
10 indicates relatively lower quality and higher governance risk. (Davis Polk, p.4) Data 
collection: ISS QS uses information publicly disclosed by companies. ISS QSS updates its 
clients annually with a list of questions they are looking to see answered in their annual reports. 
Data analysis: Companies receive an overall quality score and a score for each of the four 
pillars: Board structure, compensation/remuneration, shareholder rights, and audit &risk 
oversight. Data updating: ISS QS updates scores daily.  
Table 2.1 ESG Rating Summary Table 











ESG Score depends 100% on 
disclosure 
10,000 0-100 No No 
Sustainalytics Total 
Score 
ESG Score split between 
Preparedness, Disclosure, 
and Performance 
6,500 0-100 No No 
CDP Integrated 
Performance Score 





(8 high, 0 low) 
Yes No 
ISS Quality Score G Score depends 100% on 
disclosure  
5,600 1-10 
(1 high, 10 low) 
No No 
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Through the above qualitative study, I found high variability between agencies across 
each of their processes. The first source of variation amongst them is the agency’s data collection 
processes. Bloomberg, Sustainalytics, and ISS collect their data from publicly available 
documents such as annual reports, sustainability reports, and news sources. They use publicly 
available reports as their primary data sources. In contrast, CDP directly engages companies with 
questionnaires and surveys to collect the data. All of the rating agencies considered above 
penalize companies for missing information.  
The second source of variation is in data analysis. Answering my first research question, 
“do ESG rating agencies weigh disclosure scores more heavily than performance when 
calculating total ESG scores,” it is clear that rating agencies do value disclosure over 
performance. Bloomberg and ISS Quality Score depend 100% on disclosure. The CDP 
Integrated Performance Score does not weigh performance at all, rather splits the score between 
awareness, disclosure, management, and leadership. Out of the four rating agencies chosen, only 
Sustainalytics even takes into account performance on any level. 
These variations bring to light challenges/limitations in rating agency practices, aligned 
with the points outlined by Windolph in the report, “Assessing Corporate Sustainability Through 
Ratings: Challenges and Their Causes” (Windolph, 2011). Relevant challenges include: lack of 
standardization, lack of credibility of information, bias, tradeoffs, lack of transparency, and lack 
of independence (Windolph, 2011, p.42). For lack of standardization, it is clear that there stands 
a diversity of approaches and results across the market. Even for the rating agencies that address 
the same issues and interests, they utilize different indicators and use their varying 
methodologies. Furthermore, the credibility of company information is questionable. None of the 
companies assessed above use additional information to verify company data. The verification of 
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information remains a “significant challenge” for research organizations (Windolph, 2011, p.43). 
Research has shown that the increased reliance on publicly available data stems from a 
phenomenon known as “questionnaire fatigue resulting from the intensive surveying of 
companies” (Windolph, 2011, p.44). Companies have to spend considerable resources to survey 
and interact with companies. Some research has even shown that at certain firms, inexperienced 
employees like interns oversee the rating survey process, further questioning the credibility of 
information.  
Certain rating agencies also put special emphasis either on the environmental, social, or 
governance dimension. For example, ISS Quality score only weighs the governance dimension. 
This forms a market of information that is undifferentiated and unsuitable for stakeholders with 
different interests. As a result, stakeholders must go out of their way to assess each rating 
agency’s methodology in order to understand their score. Furthermore, the type of companies 
rated varies across agencies. Most ratings, like CDP and Sustainalytics, focus on larger 
companies and include neither small or medium sized companies. Some rating agencies even use 
an existing index as an “underlying universe” instead of actively screening for sustainability-
oriented companies. For example, the Dow Jones Index, serves as a parent index for DJSI 
(Windolph, 2011, p.45). CDP also requires a baseline disclosure score before inviting companies 
to take their questionnaire.  
All four rating agencies produce one single score. Expressing performance of companies 
with one score does make it easy to compare companies; however, when creating a single score, 
“raters assume that values can be reduced to one dimension although they are pluralistic in 
nature” (Windolph, 2011, p.45). Having one overall score means that companies can compensate 
for shortcomings in one dimension by a better performance in another. Using this logic, we can 
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infer that single scores may result in a distorted picture of actual performance. It also makes it 
increasingly difficult to compare one companies’ performance in the environmental dimension 
with another company’s performance in the same dimension. Researchers must go the extra step 
to un-simplify rating agency’s oversimplified overall scores. 
Lastly, the relationship between companies and raters raises the question of whether 
ratings are truly third-party and independent. Research organizations trying to fill the data gap 
from initial disclosure analysis chiefly depend on personal interaction with companies. CDP, 
Sustainalytics, and ISS QS send companies copies of their assessment before publishing them 
officially. When companies and rating agencies carry out the rating processes repeatedly over 
time, their relationships grow closer. Especially when financial service providers conduct ratings, 
analysts are financially incentivized to establish further business relations with the companies. 
This affiliation questions the independence of rating agencies.  
How do these variations and challenges affect the overall quality of each agency’s score? 
What do these challenges signal to companies and stakeholders? Given the above limitations, 
theoretically, companies can take advantage of the technique and create company policies 
without any intention of improving performance. Companies are even able to unfairly signal to 
both rating agencies and consumers an environmentally responsible public image. If changing 
disclosure scores is easier for companies, have companies been able to improve them over time? 






Part 3: Observational trends analysis  
 In order to check empirically if companies improved their ESG scores over time, I used a 
balanced panel data set compiled using the Bloomberg ESG <GO> terminal to observe 
observational trends. The dataset is “balanced” if each panel contains the same number of 
observations each year.  
 In order to answer the question of how scores have changed over time, I graph the change 
in Bloomberg disclosure scores from 2008 to 2016, the change in Sustainalytics scores from 
2015 to 2017, and the change in ISS QS from 2014 to 2017. Bloomberg ESG <GO> categorizes 
all 9,000+ publicly traded companies by 70+ sectors. Since all four rating agencies utilize 
different indicators for different sectors, I analyze the change in mean scores over time by sector. 
This allows me to make cross sectoral annotations when necessary.  
 Figure 3.1 is the change in Bloomberg scores 2008 vs. 2016 for the sectors with the 
largest number of companies (sectors with more than 250 companies each). The top sectors 
include: banks, capital markets, chemicals, electronic equipment, equity real estate, food 
products, hotels and restaurants, machinery, metals and mining, oil and gas, and real estate 
management. The mean change in disclosure scores, marked by the red reference line, is 7.53. 
Thus, the average company in the largest sectors increased their disclosure score by 7.53 points 
from 2008 to 2016. Across all of the sectors, observational trends are quite similar. The 
minimum increase in disclosure score by sector is 5.34 and the maximum increase in disclosure 
score by sector is 10.30.  
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Figure 3.1: Change in Bloomberg scores 2008 vs 2016 for sectors with the largest # of companies 
 
 Figure 3.2 displays the change in Bloomberg scores from 2008 to 2016 across all 70+ 
sectors. The mean change in Bloomberg disclosure score, marked by the red reference line is 6.8. 
Comparing this result to the reference line in Figure 3.1, one can infer that the addition of all 70+ 
sectors introduced outliers that altered the results. The red dot (mean) of each sector are all 
clustered around the same area, with two clear outliers labeled the health care tech sector and the 
mortgage REITS sector. Thus, the average increase in scores across sectors was fairly similar. 




Figure 3.2: Change in Bloomberg scores 2008 vs 2016 for all sectors 
 
 Figure 3.3 shows the change in Sustainalytics scores from 2015 to 2017 across all 70+ 
sectors. The mean change in Sustainalytics scores, marked by the red reference line, is 2.35. The 
minimum mean change is diversified consumer service sector with a decrease of 14.6 points, 
while the maximum mean change is the building products sector with a 21.4 point increase in 
scores. When limiting the data set to sectors with 250+ companies, the overall means dropped to 
an increase of only 1.89 points. Similar to Figure 3.2, variations in scores are more prevalent 
within industry rather than across them. 
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Figure 3.3: Change in Sustainalytics scores 2008 vs 2016 for all sectors 
 
 Figure 3.4 shows the change in ISS QS from 2014 to 2017 across all 70+ sectors. The 
mean change in ISS QS scores, marked by the red reference line, is -0.39. Meaning that the mean 
change in scores across all sectors decreased by 0.39 points. The minimum mean change 
observed was a decrease of 1.64 points, while the maximum mean change increased by 1.33. All 
the sector’s mean change clustered between these two points. It is interesting that although ISS 
QS and Bloomberg share similar methodologies, scores are quite different over time.  
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Figure 3.4: Change in ISS QS scores 2008 vs 2016 for all sectors 
 
Figures A.3, A.4, and A.5 in the Appendix report scores for Bloomberg, Sustainalytics, 
and ISS QS over time. The information coincides with a dataset balanced across all rating 
agencies, as opposed to one specific rating agency. Limiting the dataset in this way altered the 
mean change in ESG scores over time slightly. Bloomberg disclosure scores increased by 4.8 
points from 2008 to 2016. Sustainalytics increased by 0.6 points from 2015 to 2017, and ISS QS 





Table 3.1: ESG Score Correlation in 2016 Across Rating Agencies 
	 Bloomberg Sustainalytics -1 (ISS QS) CDP Integrated 
Bloomberg  
N = 7537 





















(N) is the number of observations; *significant at 5% level 
ISS QS ranks its scores 1-high and 10-low; I adjusted for this by multiplying their correlations by -1 
 
 
 Table 3.1 reveals the ESG score pairwise correlations for all four rating agencies in 2016. 
Though Bloomberg and Sustainalytics have very different methodologies, they have the 
strongest score correlation (0.65). It might be the case that strong ESG performers disclose more. 
Sustainalytics splits its ESG score between three dimensions: preparedness, disclosure, and 
performance. Since Sustainalytics is not transparent about how much weight it places on each 
dimension, the strong correlation between Bloomberg and Sustainalytics leads me to infer that 
Sustainalytics may place a significant amount of weight on disclosure.  
 CDP Integrated and ISS QS have the weakest correlation (0.013). ISS QS’s ESG score 
depends 100% on disclosure. CDP splits its ESG score between disclosure, awareness, 
management, and leadership. CDP also awards the final letter grade based on the highest 
achieving level and not the average. It is possible that companies who prioritize the governance 
dimension, which ISS QS specifically evaluates, do not prioritize environment or social 
initiatives.  
 Sustainalytics and CDP Integrated have a 0.34 correlation. Since Sustainalytics splits its 
ESG score between preparedness, disclosure, and performance, and CDP splits its ESG score 
between disclosure, awareness, management, and leadership, it is difficult to infer how the scores 
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converged. It may be due to companies, on average, having high disclosure scores. Disclosure is 
the only dimension that overlaps in both of their methodologies.  
The results in Table 3.1 show the positive ESG score pairwise correlation for all four 
rating agencies. This might be as a direct result of the rating agencies chosen. Since all four 
rating agencies weigh disclosure more heavily than performance, overall scores converge. The 
results emphasize the importance of data verification. Such a strong emphasis across rating 
agencies on disclosure is worrisome if rating agencies are not validating the information publicly 
disclosed on company websites and CSR reports. The qualitative study of methodologies above 
shows that out of the four rating agencies analyzed, none of them have a data verification process 
in place. This is a serious concern not just for academics, but also for investors, activists, and 
policymakers. 










Bloomberg 5.55 (-) 5.26 (-) 5.39(-) 6.87 
Sustainalytics 2.08 (-) 4.42 (+) 21.16 (++) 2.35 
ISS QS -1.00 (-) -0.36 (+) -1.17(-) -0.39 
(+) mean scores above the reference line; (-) mean scores below the reference line; (++); mean score 
significantly above the reference line 
 
 
 Table 3.2 cross analyzes mean ESG scores for three sectors: insurance, construction, and 
building products across different rating agencies. Whilst comparing each of their mean ESG 
scores with the reference line from the graphs above, it becomes evident that there are a number 
of inconsistencies. Other than the insurance sector which scored below average across all three 
rating agencies, the results for the rest of the sectors vary. For instance, the building products 
sector scored about 18 points above average by Sustainalytics, 1 point below average by ISSQS, 
and 1 point below average by Bloomberg. These results should give pause to economists 
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reporting high correlations between ratings and different outcomes (alpha). The inconsistencies 
evidently depicted implies that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess a rating agency’s level 
of validity. The development of a common measurement system needs to occur to lead to 
convergences.  
Answering my second research question, “if changing disclosure scores is easier for 
companies, have companies been able to improve them over time” it is clear that companies have 
improved their disclosure scores over time. Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Scores increased by 6.8 
points from 2008 to 2016. Sustainalytics increased by 2.35 points from 2015 to 2017.  
Part 4: Case Study 
To better understand the rating process, I conducted a case study of two publicly traded 
companies. I chose two companies from the same sector that had the same disclosure score in 
2008 but their percentage change in score varied over time. I first narrowed down the dataset to 
766 companies that had scores available for all four rating agencies in 2016, and Bloomberg 
disclosure scores for 2008. I then calculated the percentage change in disclosure scores from 
2008 to 2016 and sorted them by sector. This process restricted the companies for the case study 
to: MetLife Inc. and Genworth Financial Inc. Table 4.1 reports scores from all four rating 
agencies in 2016.Both MetLife and Genworth started off in 2008 with a Bloomberg disclosure 
score of 18.42. By 2016, MetLife increased its disclosure score by 147.6% to 45.61, while 
Genworth’s score decreased by 26.2% to 13.60. What happened along the way for this variance 






I utilized the following steps to construct the case study. First, I provide background 
information on each company pre-2016. An understanding of each company’s past can help 
frame key similarities and differences between Genworth and MetLife. Second, using the 
Wayback Machine, a digital archive of the World Wide Web, I analyze each company’s 2008 
corporate social responsibility policy procedure as outlined on their website at the time. Using 
the Bloomberg ESG <GO> terminal, I track down both company’s public CSR reports. After a 
thorough analysis of each company’s CSR activities in 2008, I follow the same procedure to 
gather information about both MetLife and Genworth’s CSR practices in 2016. I conclude with a 
side by side analysis of both companies.  
Before diving into the case study, an explanation of what the CSR standards were in 2008 
is important. According to a report by David Crowther and Guler Aras published in 2008, 
“Corporate Social Responsibility.” CSR is the “relationship between global corporations, 
governments of countries and individual citizens. More locally, the definition comprises of the 
relationship between a corporation and the local society in which it resides or operates 
(Crowther, 2008, p.10). According to the EU commission, “CSR is a concept whereby 
companies integrate social and environmental concerns in the business operations and their 
interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (Crowther, 2008, p. 11). In 2008, the 
principles of CSR activity were: “sustainability, accountability, and transparency.” Sustainability 
Table 4.1 Case Study 



















MetLife Inc. Insurance 18.42 45.61 147.6% 53.57 3 7 
Genworth 
Financial Inc. 
Insurance 18.42 13.60 -26.2% 44.09 1 4 
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is inherently one’s concern that what he/she does in the present has an effect on the options 
available in the future. Accountability is an organizational recognition that its action affects the 
external environment, and therefore assuming responsibility for the effects of its action 
(Crowther, 2008, p. 14). “Transparency, as a principle, means that the external impact of the 
actions of the organization can be ascertained form that organization’s reporting and pertinent 
facts that are not disguised within that reporting” (Crowther, 2008, p. 15).  
 When the economic crisis of 2008 hit the global economy, the question arose, about how 
it would affect CSR. According to, “The Impact of Recession on the Implementation of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Companies,” the sphere of CSR experienced a significant 
decrease of all spending on socially responsible activities. “Projects of marginal interest were 
rejected and CSR ceased to represent on the allocation of funds and donation” (Klara, 2011, 
p.12). Klara’s research suggests that the recession started and accelerated the transition from the 
“defensive CSR to sustainable CSR.”  
  Did the change in terminology affect how Bloomberg calculated its ESG disclosure 
score in 2008? The old Bloomberg ESG terminal explains that the methodology used to calculate 
the scores in 2008 is the same as it is now. “The score is based on 100 out of 219 raw data points 
that Bloomberg collects, and is weighted to emphasize the most commonly disclosed field. This 
weighted score is normalized to range from 0 for companies that do not disclose ESG data to 100 
for those which disclose every data point collected.” Nevertheless, since Bloomberg does not 
publicly announce the “data points/indicators” assessed, for the purpose of this thesis, I assume 
that the indicators used in 2008 were more in line with the expectations of CSR during that time. 
Thus, I deduce that Bloomberg prioritized and weighed more heavily indicators related to 
charitable giving, community impact, and volunteerism.  
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In 2008, the average Bloomberg disclosure score was 21.91/100. Both MetLife and 
Genworth scored an 18.42. Thus, both companies were in line with the CSR expectation and 
performance of the firms rated by Bloomberg. I hypothesize that both firms were transparent 
about their policies and initiatives in the three categories: charitable giving, community impact, 
and volunteerism, explaining their moderately average score.  
[4.1]: Genworth 2008 
Genworth Financial is an S&P 400 insurance company. The company, founded in 1871 
as the Life Insurance Company of Virginia, offers term life insurance, whole life insurance, 
universal life insurance, etc. Over the following decades, the company underwent several major 
acquisitions. The company became known as Genworth Financial in October of 2003 
(“Genworth Financial Inc. CNN Money”, 2018). In May 2004, Genworth became a publicly 
traded company. On April 12, 2014, a class action lawsuit commenced by the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against Genworth for “disseminating false 
and misleading statements for the investing public.” The lawsuit alleged that Genworth and 
certain senior executives made false and misleading statements about Genworth’s long-term care 
insurance business and the company’s financial statements between October 2013 and November 
2014 (“Genworth Announces Settlement”, 2014).  
In 2008, Genworth had one page on their website called Environmental Policy that 
explained their social responsibility platform. “Genworth is committed to reducing impacts on 
the environment associated with its business activities and to implementing best practices to 
support environmental sustainability.” They outline ten programs and initiatives that were still in 
the developing stage including: incorporating environmental considerations in their business 
growth strategies, training and educating employees to understand and take responsibility for 
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reducing environmental impacts at work, as well as assessing Genworth’s “carbon footprint.” In 
2008, they won the following awards: Points of Light Institute 2008 Excellence in Workplace 
Volunteer Programs Award, Industry Leadership for Straight Through Processing, Business 
Enterprise Architecture, and Fortune America’s Most Admired Companies. On their website, 
they even have a “In the Community, making a World of Difference” page that outlines 
Genworth’s dedication to taking the responsibility to do the right thing. It lists Genworth 
volunteers, partnerships, and charitable events.  
Using the Bloomberg ESG <GO> terminal, I tracked down the 2008 social responsibility 
report submitted to Bloomberg. Titled, “Genworth Community Report,” Genworth used this 
medium to inform Bloomberg of their volunteerism, donations to the community, and their 
matching gift system. Genworth matches contributions dollar-for-dollar for donations from $100 
to $10,000 annually. As opposed to publicly listing the contributions on their website, Genworth 
used this platform to showcase their charitability to Bloomberg. They made sure to include lots 
of stories from those who have benefited from their contributions. “The charitable giving arm of 
Genworth focuses on three key areas: supporting access to basic needs, enriching seniors’ lives 
and providing educational opportunities for at-risk youth” (CSR, 2008, p.4). It is evident that 
Genworth was transparent about its: charitable giving, community impact, and volunteerism in 
2008.  
[4.2]: MetLife 2008 
 MetLife Inc., founded in 1868, is the holding corporation for the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company (MLIC). MetLife is among the “largest global providers of insurance 
annuities, and employee benefit programs with 90 million customers in over 60 countries” (Staff 
&Wire Reports, 2010). The company went public in 2000. In August of 2012, MetLife payed 
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$3.2 million in fines after the Federal Reserve charged it used “unsafe and unsound practices in 
handling its mortgage servicing and foreclosure operations.” It even paid $123.5 million to the 
U.S. Department of Justice to resolve allegations it knowingly made mortgages insured by the 
US government that didn’t meet federal underwriting requirements (Leslie, 2014).  
 MetLife’s 2008 website does not outline its policies/initiatives. Rather, it links to a 
corporate citizenship report of contribution.  The report states, “MetLife has a longstanding 
commitment to empowering individuals and building healthy communities. Today, this tradition 
is evident in our business practices, the volunteer activities of MetLife Foundation, all of which 
make a positive difference in communities around the world.” At that time, they had contributed 
a total of $234 million to social and community investments and over $43.8 million to nonprofit 
organizations and $234 million in loans and equity. MetLife received the following awards: 
Business Week’s Best Places to Launch a Career, Fortune’s World Most Admired Companies, 
Newsweek’s Green Rankings, and the Uptime Institute’s 2009 Global Green 100 list. The report 
ends with a financial section that lists all of the places that they have contributed money to.  
MetLife’s 2008 report of contributions submitted to Bloomberg outlined its’ increased 
support of programs that deal with aging issues including: caregiving, civil engagement and 
community readiness. In 2008, their priorities included “neighborhood revitalizing communities 
by providing financing to organization that do not have access to traditional sources of capital” 
(CSR, 2008, p. 5). They also discuss in more detail the work of the Social Investment Program 
Initiative. MetLife invests in projects that improve the quality of life in the most basic ways, 
including housing, education, economics, community development, and health care. It is also 
evident that MetLife was effectively transparent about its: charitable giving, community impact, 
and volunteerism in 2008.  
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[4.3] Genworth change over time 
  Figure 4.1 below shows the divergence in scoring from 2008 to 2016. Genworth dropped 
from 18.42 to 13.59 in 2009. First and most importantly, Genworth stopped producing their 
“Community Reports.” The last archived document on the Bloomberg terminal is in 2008. They 
removed the link to the report from their website sometime in June of 2009, explaining the drop 
in their score. Instead, they began to more robustly explain their social responsibility initiatives 
on their website. They also created the Genworth Foundation, a foundation whose mission is to 
enhance the quality of life in communities around the world. All of the information reported on 
the Community Reports and on the Bloomberg terminal is available on the site directly. They 
explain their areas of focus, their matching gifts programs, and volunteer grant programs. 
Therefore, one can infer Genworth’s decision not to reproduce a document of the information 
made available on their website resulted in this four-point drop in their disclosure score. In May 
of 2013, Genworth revamped their entire website. Though the website structure changed, the 
information presented was exactly the same. In 2015, they re-structured their social 
responsibility page, adding in information on workplace, community, environment, governance, 
and marketplace. In 2016, Genworth linked a Corporate Social Responsibility report to their 




Figure 4.1: Change in Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score – Genworth vs. MetLife 
 
The Global Reporting Initiative is an international independent standards organization 
that helps organizations effectively disclose their impacts on social responsibility issues. First 
launched in 2000, GRI’s framework is now widespread. In 2017, 63% of the largest 100 
companies and 75% of the Global Fortune 250 reported applying the GRI framework (KPMG 
Survey, 2017). GRI’s framework for sustainability reporting helps companies identify, gather, 
and report this information in a clear manner. GRI’s declared mission is to “elevate sustainability 
reporting practices to a level equivalent to that of financial reporting in rigor, comparability, 
auditability and general acceptance” (Willis, 2003, p.233). Companies use the GRI standards, “as 
a set, to prepare a sustainability report… preparing a report in accordance with the GRI standards 
provides an inclusive picture of an organization’s material topics, their related impacts, and how 
they are managed” (GRI Universal Standards, 2018). GRI 101: Foundation is the starting point 
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for an organization to use the Standards to report about its economic, environmental, and/or 
social impacts.  
Given its widespread use and apparent legitimacy, I recommend that firms looking to 
increase their disclosure score utilize this standard to restructure their CSR reports. Bloomberg 
analysts also recommend firms to format the pdf so that it is searchable. Analysts evaluate 
thousands of companies; the more accessible and comprehensive the information, the better. 
 Since Bloomberg basses its overall ESG score entirely on disclosure, Genworth needs to 
better communicate with the public the work that they are currently doing to increase their scores 
in the future. They need to: adapt the framework recommended by the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), create a robust corporate social responsibility report, and publish updates 
annually that are accessible to the public.  
[4.4]: MetLife change over time 
 MetLife’s progress proceeded differently. In 2011, Steven A. Kandrian became 
Chairman, President, and CEO of MetLife. He envisioned corporate responsibility as something 
fundamental to the core business mission as opposed to an initiative tacked on to a company’s 
mission statement (CSR MetLife, 2011, p. 4). Alongside the CSR report published, MetLife 
created a new page called “MetLife & the Environment,” that explains their four key areas of 
CSR focus. This shift in perspective is a possible reason for the jump in ESG scores in 2011. 
They claim to have reduced their energy consumption by more than 16%. They invested $1 
billion in renewable energy projects. MetLife also gave over $1.5 million for biodiversity and 
healthy aging products.  
In 2013, MetLife re-structured the corporate social responsibility portion of their website, 
outlining the customer and employee focus areas, the environmental impact they have had, their 
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commitment to the community, and overall reach. The CSR report tripled in length. Although the 
initiatives are still the same, MetLife was able to increase their score by 10 points in one year by 
reorganizing the handbook using GRI standards. At 65 pages, their CSR report remains robust 
and informative.  
 The result of this case study displays how publicly traded companies can increase their 
Bloomberg disclosure score, answering part three of the thesis question. First, companies need to 
disclose information on their CSR initiatives using at least two different mediums: their website 
and a CSR report. Second, the information disclosed in the CSR report needs to be robust, 
detailing initiatives preferably using the GRI reporting standard. Third, the company website 
needs to have a sophisticated Social Responsibility portal with a number of different tabs and 
quotes. The more refined the better. Analysts looking to judge ESG disclosure need to be able to 
access the information easily.  
[7] Conclusion  
 The ESG industry has grown tremendously in the last decade and rating agencies serve as 
an important intermediary between companies and their investors. From 2014 to 2016, 
sustainable, responsible, and impact investing enjoyed a growth rate of more than 33%. 
According to USSIF, the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, more than 1 out of 
5 dollars under professional management in the United States today – 22% of the 40.3 trillion in 
total assets under management is involved in SRI. Investors allocate billions of dollars in capital 
on the judgement of the rating agencies and many academic papers rely on them as well (Naylor, 
2018). The lack of standardization raises questions about the validity of rating agencies and what 
information ESG scores signal to consumers.  
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This research represents one of the first empirical studies utilizing a comprehensive 
database to investigate the effects of disclosure scores on overall ESG scores. I address three 
questions with respect to ESG investing in this paper. (1) Do ESG rating agencies weigh 
disclosure scores more heavily than performance scores when calculating total ESG scores? 
From the methodological comparison across four rating agencies, it is evident that rating 
agencies do value disclosure over performance. Bloomberg and ISS QS depend 100% on 
disclosure. Out of the four rating agencies, only Sustainalytics even takes into account 
performance on any level.  (2) If changing disclosure scores is easier for companies, have 
companies been able to improve them over time? The results show that the mean in Bloomberg 
disclosure score did indeed improve over time. All observational trends portrayed an increase in 
disclosure from 2008 to 2016. (3) How can publicly-traded companies improve their scores 
given common rating agency practices? The case study showed that companies can improve their 
scores by restructuring their CSR reports using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standard 
and disclosing CSR initiatives using at least two different mediums.  
 Although the current study adopts rigorous methods and a large publicly available 
database to test changes over time, it also faces several limitations. First, I had hoped to conduct 
interviews with representatives from each of the four rating agencies. Lack of transparency when 
it comes to each company’s methodology left a number of questions unanswered. For instance, is 
the overall Sustainalytics score simply the average of all preparedness, disclosure, and 
performance? Their website and methodology report provides no information on the weighting 
of different indicators. I was also interested in hearing the answers to the following questions: 1) 
What do you feel is the role of your rating agency in the CSR space and how does it differentiate 
itself from similar agencies? 2) How can investors utilize your ratings in their investment 
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decisions? 3) How closely do you interact with the companies you are rating? 4) How do you 
believe disclosure impacts overall company ratings? The employees at each of the respective 
rating agencies that answered my phone call, deferred to e-mail and simply copied and pasted the 
information already available publicly on their website. I did not learn anything new. Ideally, I 
would have been able to interview each rating agency at length.  
Second, due to data restraints and the changing ESG market, Bloomberg is the only rating 
agency that had data from 2008 to 2016. Preferably, I would have access to scores for all four 
rating agencies during that same time-period. Lastly, for the case study, the criteria that the 
Bloomberg analysts use when scoring firms is not publicly available. Since Bloomberg only uses 
publicly available information when scoring companies, I would have preferred access to their 
methodology so that I could score MetLife and Genworth myself to find out specifically what 
varied over time. Future studies should address the issues above.  
 Limitations aside, this study contributes to the CSR literature by helping to tease out 
some of the nuances to explain the relationship between disclosure, performance, and overall 
ESG scores. Practically, the results of this research show how companies can effectively increase 
their ESG scores. Though companies should seek to more effectively implement CSR 
mechanisms, a simple restructuring of annual CSR reports and an adherence to the GRI standard 
can easily increase overall ESG scores. Can a company get a good rating on “fluff” alone? Since 
none of the rating agencies analyzed in this study instilled a data verification process, it is 
unclear if greenwashing or becoming more transparent about actual efforts gets you the higher 
ESG rating. Similar to what Michael Gratwohl concludes in, “Firm-value effects of CSR 
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Figure A.2: GISR Hub Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score search output 
 
 






Bloomberg Disclosure Scores Over time (Balanced) 
sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
                
Banks 21.8 24.1 21.5 22.1 22.2 23.2 23.9 24.1 23.1 
Capital Markets 18.8 20.5 19.6 19.9 20.3 20.9 21.5 21.9 21.9 
Chemicals 26.9 28.2 29.0 29.9 31.2 32.2 32.9 33.2 33.0 
Electronic Equipment 22.5 23.1 23.2 23.9 24.8 25.7 26.1 26.2 25.4 
Equity Real Estate 15.3 16.4 15.8 16.8 17.9 20.1 20.9 21.6 21.4 
Food Products 22.7 24.2 24.4 26.0 26.9 27.9 29.1 29.4 29.9 
Hotels, Restaurant 18.9 18.9 20.6 21.1 22.0 23.2 24.1 24.2 24.0 
Machinery 22.3 23.7 23.2 23.9 24.1 25.3 26.0 26.3 26.2 
Metals & Mining 23.8 25.8 27.4 29.8 30.3 31.7 32.7 33.3 33.2 
Oil & Gas  24.9 26.8 25.8 26.5 27.8 29.4 30.0 30.4 30.2 
Real Estate 16.1 18.7 19.1 20.6 21.4 22.6 24.4 25.4 26.2 
                
Total 21.9 23.5 23.0 23.9 24.6 25.8 26.6 27.0 26.7 
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Sustainalytics Total Scores over time (Balanced) 
sector 2015 2016 2017 
    
Banks 59.4 58.3 56.8 
Capital Markets 65.5 61.7 53.7 
Chemicals 52.4 52.8 52.5 
Electronic Equip 38.7 38.8 40.9 
Equity Real Estate 53.8 56.6 58.1 
Food Products 41.4 42.1 46.7 
Hotels, Restaurant 51.3 53.4 53.5 
Machinery 56.5 56.2 57.6 
Metals & Mining 57.2 56.7 57.5 
Oil & Gas 50.9 51.3 55.7 
Real Estate 54.7 58.3 56.8 
    
Total 54.0 54.2 54.6 
Figure A.4: Sustainalytics ESG scores over time balanced across time and across rating agencies 
 
ISS QS Scores over time (Balanced) 
sector 2014 2015 2016 2017 
         
Banks 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.5 
Capital Markets 5.8 5.4 4.8 5.0 
Chemicals 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 
Electronic Equipment 4.2 4.8 4.3 4.3 
Equity Real Estate 5.0 4.7 4.5 5.1 
Food Products 5.9 5.6 5.9 5.6 
Hotels, Restaurant 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 
Machinery 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.7 
Metals & Mining 5.9 6.0 5.5 5.2 
Oil & Gas 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.2 
Real Estate 5.7 5.3 5.4 4.7 
         
Total 5.4 5.3 5.0 4.9 
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